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ABSTRACT 
 
 Methods for Identifying Best-Value Bid for Performance-based Maintenance Contracts.  
(December 2010) 
Jubair Ahmed, B.S., Bangladesh University of Engineering & Technology, Dhaka 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Nasir G. Gharaibeh 
 
Performance-based contracting (PBC) for roadway maintenance is relatively new 
among various alternative contracting options available at present and is increasingly 
drawing more attention from state Departments of Transportation (DOTs) and the 
contracting community.  Because performance-based maintenance contracts extend over 
multiple years (typically 5-7 years) and shift performance risk to contractors, it is critical 
that contractors be selected based on a form of best-value method rather than on the 
conventional low-bid method. Currently, highway agencies use various methods for 
determining the best-value bid based on cost and technical scores.  
Five best-value bid identification methods that are already in practice by the state 
transportation agencies in Florida, Virginia, North Carolina, United Kingdom, and New 
Zealand were used as case studies for this research. These five methods were evaluated in 
terms of the agency’s willingness to pay for quality and the neutrality of these methods 
with respect to lowest bid and highest quality. To understand and describe the bid 
evaluation method, the agency can develop a willingness to pay (WTP) curve. This curve 
should represent the agency’s needs and budget, reflect their project characteristics, and 
accommodate associated performance risks. An Excel macro based software tool has 
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been developed that automates these five best-value bid identification methods and also 
helps customize anyone of these options for any agency.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 v 
  ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
 
             All praises for the Almighty. I am grateful for His Mercy and Guidance and for 
His Blessings to give me the ability to join the Aggie network.  
             I am grateful to my advisor, Dr. Nasir Gharaibeh first of all for considering me 
for the Research Assistantship position. I am also grateful for his enduring patience and 
wide flexibility during the entire session I worked with him. I hope his overall research 
directive and thoughtful contribution in details has transformed this thesis into a valuable 
work piece of which I am proud. I also acknowledge the support from Dr. Ivan 
Damnjanovic and Dr. Mohammed E. Haque and would like to thank them for being on 
my thesis committee.  
            I am grateful to Dr. Stephanie Houghton of Economics Department, Texas A&M 
University for her valuable advice and time. Also I would like to thank Mr. Frederick G. 
Haasch, Contract Officer of Virginia Department of Transportation, Mr. Mark Pinner, 
West Coast Area Manager of New Zealand Transport Authority, Mr. Ashley Jones 
Hanna, District Contract Officer of Florida Department of Transportation and Mr. Jeff 
Baker, Head of Maintenance Contracts, Ministry of Transportation, Canada for providing 
me necessary data. And thanks to Ms. Pam Kopf, Mr. Wally Simpson and Mr. Arif 
Choudhury for wonderful support from Texas Transportation Institute. Never the less, 
love and friendship from my fellow Aggies deserves great appreciation.  
         Finally, love for my family back home and here for supporting me all the time. 
Much appreciation is deserved by the Bangladeshi students’ community for extending 
their helping hands.  
 vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
  Page 
ABSTRACT………………………………………………………………….. iii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS…………………………………………………... v 
TABLE OF CONTENTS…………………………………………………….. vi 
LIST OF TABLES……………………………………………………………. viii 
LIST OF FIGURES…………………………………………………………... ix 
CHAPTER  
I INTRODUCTION…………………………………………………... 1 
  National and International Practice…………………………… 1 
  Advantages and Disadvantages of Performance Based Contract.. 3 
  Problem Statement………………………………………………. 4 
  Research Objective………………………………………………. 5 
  Research Methodology…………………………………………... 5 
  Organization……………………………………………………... 6 
II LITERATURE REVIEW……………………………………………. 7 
III CASE STUDIES…………………………………………………….. 14 
  Florida Department of Transportation Case Study……………… 14 
  Virginia Department of Transportation Case Study……………... 17 
  North Carolina Department of Transportation Case Study……… 20 
  New Zealand Transport Agency Case Study……………………. 24 
  United Kingdom Highway Agency Case Study…………………. 27 
IV ANALYSIS OF CASE STUDIES…………………………………... 33 
  Evaluation of Willingness to Pay for Quality …………………... 33 
  FDOT Bid Evaluation Method…………………………………... 33 
  VDOT Bid Evaluation Method………………………………….. 34 
  NCDOT Bid Evaluation Method………………………………... 35 
  NZTA Bid Evaluation Method…………………………………... 36 
  HAUK Bid Evaluation Method………………………………….. 37 
 vii 
CHAPTER Page 
  Discussion of Evaluation Results………………………………... 38 
  Neutrality in Best-Value Bid Evaluation Methods……………… 40 
V CUSTOMIZATION OF BEST-VALUE BID SELECTION 
METHODS………………………………………………………….. 
46 
  Customization Process…………………………………………... 46 
  FDOT Bid Evaluation Method…………………………………... 47 
  HAUK Bid Evaluation Method………………………………….. 48 
  NCDOT Bid Evaluation Method………………………………... 48 
  Application of the Customization Process………………………. 49 
VI SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH……….. 53 
  Summary………………………………………………………… 53 
  Conclusion………………………………………………………. 54 
  Future Research …………………………………………………. 55 
REFERENCES……………………………………………………………….. 56 
APPENDIX A…………………………………………………………………… 58 
APPENDIX B…………………………………………………………………… 71 
APPENDIX C…………………………………………………………………… 75 
VITA .. 76 
 
…………………………………………………………………………
 viii 
LIST OF TABLES 
                  
TABLE Page 
1 Weights of Contractor Selection Criteria in Different Countries….. 7 
2 Sample Bid Evaluation Calculation as per QBPR System………… 11 
3 FDOT’s Technical Score Evaluation Criteria……………………... 16 
4 Maximum Point Values for Evaluation Criteria Used by VDOT…. 19 
5 Technical Score Criteria for North Carolina DOT Case Study…… 21 
6 Quality Credit Distribution for Technical Proposal (NCDOT)…… 22 
7 Hypothetical Example for Calculating Adjusted Price (NCDOT).. 23 
8 Weighted Sum Calculation for NZTA…………………………… 25 
9 Technical Score Criteria for NZTA Transport Agency Case Study 26 
10 Calculation of Supplier Quality Premium for NZTA……………. 26 
11 Identification of Best-Value Bid for NZTA…………………….. 27 
12 Quality Marks for UKHA Bid Evaluation……………………… 29 
13 Categories for Part A Marks (UKHA 2009)……………………. 29 
14 Categories for Part B Marks (UKHA 2009)……………………. 30 
15 Quality Score Distribution (UK-HA 2009)…………………….. 31 
16 Financial Score Distribution (UK-HA 2009)…………………… 31 
17 Combined Score Calculation (UKHA 2009)…………………… 31 
18 Hypothetical Bid Price Range and Technical Marks…………… 41 
19 Sample Input and Corresponding Output for Customization Process 49 
20 Comparison of Quality Attributes Used by Different Agencies… 51 
21 Default Weights and Quality Credit……………………………… 52 
 ix 
LIST OF FIGURES  
FIGURE                                                                                                                    Page 
 
1 Flowchart of FDOT’s Maintenance Contract Bid Evaluation Method....      15 
2 3-D Depiction of TPS as Function of Price Ratio and TTM for FDOT...  17 
3 Flowchart of VDOT’s Maintenance Contract Bid Evaluation Method...  18 
4 3-D Depiction of TPS as Function of Price Ratio and TTM for VDOT.. 20 
5 Flowchart of NCDOT’s Maintenance Contract Bid Evaluation Method. 21 
6 3-D Depiction of Adjusted Price as Function of Price Ratio and TTM 
for NCDOT 23 
7 Flowchart of NZTA’s Maintenance Contract Bid Evaluation Method...       24 
8 3-D Depiction of Adjusted Price as Function of Price Ratio and TTM 
for NZTA 27 
9 Flowchart for UKHA Bid Evaluation Method……………………….... 28 
10 3-D Depiction of TPS as Function of Price Ratio and TTM for HAUK 32 
11 Price Ratio Vs Technical Marks (TTML=80)………………………….. 39 
12 Price Ratio Vs Technical Marks (TTML=70)………………………….. 39 
13 FDOT’s Best Bid Simulation Results…………………………………. 43 
14 Change in Price Ratio Vs Change in TTM…………………………….. 43 
15 UKHA’s Best Bid Simulation Results………………………………..... 44 
16 NCDOT’s Best Bid Simulation Results………………………………... 44 
17 NZTA’s Best Bid Simulation Results………………………………….. 45 
18 Summary for Determining Technical and Financial Weights………….. 46 
19 TxBID Tool for TxDOT Bid Design…………………………………... 50 
………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………
1 
 
_____________________ 
This thesis follows the style of the Journal of Construction Engineering and 
Management. 
 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 Performance-based maintenance contracting (PBMC) for roadway is relatively 
new among various alternative contracting options available at present and is 
increasingly drawing more attention from state Departments of Transportation (DOTs) 
and the contracting community. Under performance-based contracts, the agency (owner) 
does not specify any method or material requirements. Instead, it specifies measurable 
performance targets and standards (also called outcomes) that the maintenance 
contractor is required to meet or exceed within a certain timeframe. For example, the 
contractor is not paid for the linear feet of fence maintenance, but for the outcome of this 
work (such as, no damage that allows access through fence, less than 10% vegetation on 
fence, etc.).  
 
National and International Practice 
Various broader forms of performance based specifications and contracting have 
been used in many instances around the world. Thus, Performance Based Maintenance 
Contract (PBMC) is being exercised in many parts of the world including some states in 
the USA and in some other developing countries (Hyman 2009). This concept has been 
familiar with different names in different states, countries or provinces. In Virginia, the 
concept is termed as Turnkey Asset Maintenance Services (TAMS); in Georgia the 
concept is termed as Comprehensive Maintenance Contract (CMC); in Western 
Australia, it is called Term Network Contract (TNC) with an advancement of Integrated 
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Service Arrangement (ISA); in Ontario, Canada, it is called Area Maintenance Contract 
(AMC); in the UK, the contracting is known as Managing Agent Contract (MAC); in the 
New Zealand and Australia, this is familiar as Performance-Specified Maintenance 
Contract (PSMC); in Argentina this is expressed as the Contract for Rehabilitation and 
Maintenance. The National Cooperative Highway Research Program (NCHRP) 
synthesis Report No. 389 (Hyman 2009) used the term Performance-Based Maintenance 
Contract (PBMC).  
States in the USA that have experience in PBMC include Virginia, Florida, North 
Carolina, Texas, Maryland, Idaho, Oklahoma, New Mexico, District of Columbia, Utah, 
Alaska, and Georgia. Evolution of the PBMC contracts in the USA started in the year 
1997 through Virginia Department of Transportation. Texas Department of 
Transportation signed for the first time two PBMC Contracts for IH-35 in Waco and IH-
20 in Dallas. In the year 2007 a major contractor in the US possessed more than $2.5 
billion worth PBMC contracts signed nationwide (VMS 2007).   
Road assets that can be included in typical asset management contract include 
pavement surface, roadsides, tunnels, bridges, signs and traffic signals, guard rails, 
vegetation and aesthetics, rest areas, pavement markings etc (Stankevich, Qureshi and 
Queiroz 2005) . Types of road assets that will be favorable to consider for PBMC 
projects depend on number of factors; whether the owner agency or the contractor 
support the concept, whether the project is goal oriented and can be influenced by the 
contractor, the ability of the agency to use incentive/disincentive scheme, whether the 
contractor has flexibility in achieving the goals, the available resources of the owner 
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agency to develop the contract and measure the performance, whether the owner agency 
can use best value or enhanced low bid award and finally whether the owner agency has 
sufficient time to train the work forces about the PBMC (SAIC 2006). 
 
Advantages and Disadvantages of Performance Based Contract 
Pakkala (2006) discussed some of the advantages and disadvantages of 
performance-based contracting (PBC) in general. The PBC concept is still new and 
much of the advantages are disputed. For example, some agencies do not agree that there 
is saving in terms of monetary value in this method. Another controversial aspect is the 
Level of Service (LOS). The expectation for improving the level of service is always 
there although the agency’s current service standard might be low. The agency has to 
decide which LOS is to achieve through the contracting process and relates it to the cost 
structure.  Besides cost saving and improved level of service, typical advantages also 
include shifting of risks to the contractor, scope for innovation, better asset management 
or integrated service arrangements, utilizing the benefits of partnering, economy of 
scale, improved or predicted budgeting and new service industry build up. However, 
disadvantages are also there as discussed or experienced by the community that include 
higher procurement cost, lengthy acquisition process, reduction in competition, 
uncertainty in long term relationships, loss of agency control and flexibility in fund 
management and challenges involving mobilization.  Estimated potential saving that can 
be achieved by the owner agency typically ranges from 30-40% depending on location, 
culture and other factors affecting optimization (pakkala 2006).  
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Problem Statement 
Because performance-based maintenance contracts extend over multiple years 
(typically 5-7 years) and shift performance risk to contractors (i.e. failure to meet 
performance standards and targets), it is critical that contractors be selected based on a 
form of best-value method rather than the conventional low-bid method. Much of the 
partnering success and fruitful project outcome depends on setting up the optimum 
contractor selection criteria and choosing the best-value contractor. Highway agencies 
use the best-value approach for awarding contracts to obtain the optimum combination 
of bid price and bid quality. Normally, a cost score is determined based on the bid price 
and the technical score is determined based on quality-related items (such as 
qualifications, quality management plan, past experience, etc.). The two scores are then 
combined to determine the best-value bid. It is to be noted that the term quality is used 
throughout this study to refer to the quality of the bid (not the maintenance project). 
Currently, highway agencies use various methods for determining the best-value 
bid based on these cost and technical scores. Little efforts have been made to understand 
and compare the various methods that are being used for determining the best-value bid 
based on these cost and technical scores. Thus, there is a need to analyze current 
methods for evaluating the best-value bid and identifying the best bid with optimum 
combination of price and quality for performance-based contracts for roadway 
maintenance. 
 
 
  
5 
Research Objective 
The primary objectives of the research are as follows: 
1. Identify current practices in best-value bid identification methodologies for 
procuring performance-based highway maintenance contract. 
2. Investigate the theoretical soundness and possible drawbacks of existing best-
value bid identification methods.  
3. Device a methodology for customizing the existing best-value identification 
methods for use in performance-based contracts for roadway maintenance.  
 
Research Methodology 
The following steps will be followed to accomplish the objectives of this 
research:  
Step 1: Perform Literature Review 
This step will lead to a better understanding of the core issues involved in 
identifying best-value bid with focus on performance maintenance contract.  
Step 2: Identify and Computerize Existing Methods for Best-Bid Identification 
Methods  
Alternative methods for best-value bid identification will be identified and 
summarized through decision-making flowcharts. These methods will then be coded in a 
software tool for further sensitivity analysis (see Step 3). Emphasis will be made on the 
state highway agencies that are experienced in performance-based contracting.  
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Step 3: Evaluate and Improve Existing Methods for Best-Bid Identification Methods 
A comprehensive evaluation will be carried out on the best-value bid 
identification methods that were identified and computerized in Step 2.  The analysis 
will reveal the strengths and possible drawbacks of these methods, as well as potential 
ways to improve them.  
Step 4: Develop a Methodology for Customizing Existing Methods for Best-Bid 
Identification Methods 
In this step, a computerized methodology will be developed for customizing the 
existing best-value identification methods for use in performance-based contracts for 
roadway maintenance. 
 
Organization  
The thesis work has been organized into six chapters. Chapter I provides an 
overview of PBMC and describes the research objectives and scope. Chapter II focuses 
on reviewing the existing literature, with emphasis on contractor selection and 
evaluation criteria that can be used in PBMC. Chapter III discusses five case studies of 
best-value bid identification methods for PBMC. Chapter IV analyzes the case studies. A 
sensitivity analysis was performed through software automation to investigate the 
neutrality of the methods. Chapter V discusses the customization process for the 
optimum method of selecting the best-value bid. Finally chapter VI concludes with 
summary discussion and future research needs.    
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
             Gransberg and Molenaar (2004) defined best-value procurement as “the process 
which allows government contracting agencies to evaluate offers based on total 
procurement cost, technical solution, completion dates, and other criteria.” Modified or 
enhanced low bid and the best value selection require that certain weights are distributed 
for technical evaluation instead of assigning 100 percent values for the price. Pakkala 
(2002) suggested that Best-Value and innovative PBMC procurement success is 
contingent upon to the extent of quality criteria taken into consideration instead of only 
price. Table 1 shows different price and quality measures used by the different countries 
for best-value bid evaluation in performance-based contracting.  
 
Table 1. Weights of Contractor Selection Criteria in Different Countries (Pekkala 2002) 
 
Country Weights for Selection Criteria 
Sydney, Western Australia and Tasmania 50% price, 50% other, varies with territory 
Alberta, Canada 78% price, 22% other 
British Columbia, Canada  40% price; 60% other 
Ontario, Canada 90% price; 10% other 
England 30-40% price; 60-70% other 
Finland 75% price; 25% other 
New Zealand 50% price; 50% technical criteria 
Sweden 90% price; 10% other 
 
 
            Best-value process is designed to maximize innovation and enhance performance 
through a cooperative and trust worthy partnering process that share risks and rewards. 
SAIC (2006) contracting framework suggests three dimensional valuations for contractor 
selection that include technical evaluation, quality management/staffing/past 
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performance evaluation and finally price criteria. Contractors’ proposals are given 
certain weights for each evaluation category. A minimum technical and management 
scoring is established for further consideration of whether the price is reasonable.  
Other alternative methods for contractor evaluation and selection are discussed in 
the NCHRP Report 10-61 and two of them are cited in the SAIC (2006) report. One of 
them is Quantitative Cost Technical Trade off and the other is Qualitative Cost 
Technical Trade off. The Army Source Selection Manual (2007) uses a Qualitative Cost 
Technical Trade Off. The selection is subjective and depends on the judgment of the 
officials instead of scale and rating. If the lowest cost proposal is “superior” or is 
“essentially equal” to other proposal in terms of non cost factors then the award is made 
to the lowest priced offer. Two officers may not arrive at the same conclusion although 
they follow the same process.  
Vassallo (2007) formulated an interesting idea that is based on microeconomic 
theory. He has introduced new terms like “Gross social benefits”, “Net social benefits”, 
“Marginal maintenance and operational cost”, “Quality Level”, “Quality Index” etc to 
explain the optimum bidding procedure to recruit the optimum bidder for infrastructure 
management services. Instead of using a fixed and pre-defined level of service (i.e., 
expected performance level), the contractors are allowed to submit their best-value bid 
price along with the best quality index or level of service they can achieve. The highway 
agency will then decide which combination of price and quality index will be the best for 
them to maximize the net social benefits. Each bidder will bid according to their best 
combination of the level of service quality and operational cost where the marginal cost 
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of operation and maintenance will be equal to the offered marginal quality. Also there 
will be minimum bid quality level below which the contractors will not be allowed to 
bid. The contractor that gives the highest net social benefits will be selected. The 
highway agency has to fix high disincentive scheme in order to prohibit overoptimistic 
bidding.  
            Performance Based Studies Research Group (Kashiwagi 2005) has figured out 
the differences between performance based procurement and price based procurement in 
their research that was based on analysis of 350 survey results of performance based 
procurement. The author suggests that the industry should move forward to the 
performance based procurement which they claim have higher performance number 
(97%) than the price based procurement. The study reinforces that performance based 
procurement in the construction industry significantly shifts the risk to the contractor, 
diverts the system from subjectivity to objectivity and select the best contractor by 
taking price and performance rating of the contractor both into account. The group has 
proposed a Performance Information Procurement System (PIPS ®) model that describes 
in details how to select the best performance based contractor for best-value 
confirmation.  
Minchin et al (2005) suggested a quality based contractor rating model named as 
Quality Based Performance Rating (QBPR) system for contractor selection. They have 
considered Project Performance Factor (PPF) based on both questionnaire and past test 
results. The questionnaire based performance factor (PPFq) considers project personnel, 
project management /control, schedule adherence, contractor organization and plant and 
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equipment aspects and provide some weights for each component. The weights have 
been evaluated based on the author’s previous research that was based on the responses 
from focus group, survey and investigator’s experience.  The materials and workmanship 
factors (PPFd) was evaluated based on the test results recorded with the DOTs from the 
contractor’s previous projects.  Finally the combined performance factor is calculated 
using both performance factors using 20:80 (Test Results: Questionnaire) ratio as shown 
in equation 2.2. The weight method has been referred to the building construction 
industry that uses similar weights ratio for quality and performance (CONQUAS 2003). 
The Contractor Factor (CF) is calculated by taking the averages of contractor’s Project 
Performance Factors for all projects. A Project Value (PV) weight is accommodated to 
adjust for the project sizes that give the Weighted Contractor Factor (WCF).  
     PPFq  =    0.3 (Project Personnel)  
+ 0.2(Project Management/Control)  
+ 0.2(Schedule Adherence)  
+ 0.2(Contractor Organization)  
+0.1(Plant and Equipment)                                                                        (2.1) 
  
     PPF = 0.2(PPFd) + 0.8(PPFq)                                                                                   (2.2) 
 
      𝐶𝐹 =   PPF
𝑁
         
   
  𝑊𝐶𝐹 =   PPF  x PV
 𝑃𝑉
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Table 2 shows the example calculation for bid evaluation for three contractors A, 
B and C. The Highway Agency official will be responsible for allotting the Quality 
points against unit CF which may differ from project to project. For this project this has 
been assigned as 10,000 quality points. The C factor in dollar amount is calculated by 
taking the product of CF and Quality points and then it is deducted from the Contractor’s 
bid price. Contractor C has the lowest Total bid price (adjusted) and thus wins the bid 
although contractor C is the highest bidder considering price.   
 
 
       Table 2. Sample Bid Evaluation Calculation as per QBPR System (Minchin 2005) 
 
Contractor 
 
Bid Amount 
 
CF 
$/Quality 
Point 
 
“C” Factor 
 
Total Bid 
A $2,175,000 91 $10,000 $910,000 $1,265,000 
B $2,200,000 88 $10,000 $880,000 $1,320,000 
C $2,225,000 97 $10,000 $970,000 $1,255,000 
 
 
Waara and Brochner (2005) examined 386 public bidding documents in the 
Swedish Municipalities in 2003 and concluded that typically 70% price weight 
combined with three non-price criteria were used for contractor selection. Prices were 
translated into scale value using lowest bid or bid spread or average bid prices. Lowest 
bid price formulas were further subdivided into four categories. Non-price criteria were 
evaluated based on either absolute or on relative merits.  The paper also used regression 
analysis (Johnson and Wichern 1998) to figure out that the lowest weight for any non-
price criterion depended on the inverse number of the criteria. After analyzing 164 cases 
that involved non-price criteria for contractor selection, they found that the average 
minimum weight for non-price criterion was 11.3% and the average maximum was 
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around 17.6%. The regression equation fitted for minimum and maximum weights are 
shown in equations 2.3 and 2.4.   
𝑤𝑚𝑖𝑛 =   
0.273
𝑚
+ 0.0148                                                    (2.3) 
 
𝑤𝑚𝑎𝑥 =   
0.140
𝑚
+ 0.1256                                                   (2.4) 
Use of multi-criteria contractor selection increases the contractor’s incentive to 
align more with the Owner’s needs and incorporates public policy objectives in the 
procurement process. The contractor incentive is high enough when the bid evaluation 
model is transparent, likelihood of future contract is more obvious and the weights for 
non-price criteria being decisive. The paper also explains the degree of information flow 
required about the bid evaluation criteria and corresponding weights to the bidders 
before their submission of bids. If the intention is to induce innovation from at least one 
of the bidders, then it would be recommended not to pre-specify the criteria and weights 
in details. This would lead to alternative investment of the owner agency’s procurement 
resources in better defining the performance terms and preparing transparent bid 
documents that would later avoid transaction costs in terms of bid evaluation and 
litigation risks due to favoritism accuse. Bid evaluation cost can also be reduced by 
minimizing the number of criteria. Besides, minimizing the number of non-price 
selection criteria also increases the likelihood of choosing different bidder. Waara and 
Brochner (2005) found that no Swedish Municipalities used more than 11 criteria in 
selecting the best-value bid as found from the 386 bid analyses.  
Lo and Yan (2009) has postulated a simulation approach analyzing the pricing 
behavior of contractors and dynamic competition process to evaluate the Qualification-
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Based Selection (QBS) of contractors. They concluded that the contractor’s 
opportunistic bidding behavior can be avoided and quality be ensured only if the 
contractor’s past performance is carefully and closely examined and reflected in the bid 
evaluation process.  
Abdelrahman et al (2008) conducted research on the Best-Value Model based on 
the past projects data provided by the Minnesota Department of Transportation 
(MnDOT) and identified and analyzed the specific evaluation criteria and their weight 
impacts for best value score determination for each contractor for a specific project. 
Weighted average method and analytical hierarchy process were used as alternative 
options for selecting the best value bid. As cited in the paper, the MnDOT Engineers 
suggested a price weight in the range of 75-80% for the transition period; from the 
lowest bid to the Best-Value contractor selection.  
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CHAPTER III 
CASE STUDIES  
This chapter describes and analyzes five best-value bid identification methods 
used by five different highway agencies for performance-based maintenance contracts. 
In four of these case studies, the contract has already been awarded by the highway 
agency and is currently under execution by the maintenance contractors, whereas the 
fifth one (UK Highway Agency) is a model contract usually followed as a standard 
contract format by the agency.  
 
Florida Department of Transportation Case Study  
            This case study consists of Florida Department of Transportation’s (FDOT 2008) 
asset maintenance contract #E5N05 for maintenance of primary highways in Brevard, 
Osceola, and portions of Orange and Volusia Counties in Florida. The contract period is 
from July 1, 2009 up to June 30, 2016, for a total of 7 years with a provision of possible 
renewal once or twice with mutual agreements of both parties.  The actual bid tabulation 
for this case study has been attached to appendix B. 
            The flowchart in Figure 1 shows the award process for the successful contractor. 
The minimum technical score required is 70. Price and Technical proposal are given 30 
and 70 percent of weights as determined by formulae 3.1 and 3.2. The contractor with 
highest total proposal score (i.e., weighted sum of technical and price scores) is 
identified as the best-value bid and thus wins the bid. Thus, it is clear that meeting the 
minimum technical score requirement is not sufficient to win the bid. The agency by 
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establishing price and technical proposal weights defines its incentive scheme for the 
quality which may be understood through the analysis of equivalent bid concept. Two 
bids can be said equivalent if, after evaluation, their total proposal score are same 
although they have different technical and price score combination. 
  
 
Fig. 1. Flowchart of FDOT’s Maintenance Contract Bid Evaluation Method 
 
Bid proposal is evaluated based on predefined project-specific technical criteria 
(see Table 3) to determine the total technical marks (TTM). A Technical Score (TS) is 
then computed as shown in Formula 3.1.  
𝑇𝑆 =  𝑇𝑇𝑀 × 0.7                        (3.1)  
Price Score (PS) is computed relative to the lowest bid price according to 
Formula 3.2.   
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𝑃𝑆 =  
𝑃𝐿
𝑃 
× 30                        (3.2) 
where PL is the lowest bid price and P is the Proposer’s bid price. 
The Total Proposal Score (TPS) is calculated using Formula 3.3.  
TPS = TS + PS                       (3.3)  
 
         Table 3. FDOT’s Technical Score Evaluation Criteria (FDOT 2008)  
Item Mark 
1. Executive Summary 5 
2. Administrative Plan 25 
a.  Identification of Key Personnel, Organization Structure, Coord., Comm. 10 
b. Contractor Experience 10 
c. DBE/Respect/Agency Participation 2 
d. Proposed Facilities Capabilities 3 
3. Management and Technical Plan 25 
a. Plan to achieve and maintain MRP 15 
b. Permit processing plan NA 
c. Bridge Inspection NA 
d. Customer service resolution plan 10 
4. Operation Plan 35 
a. Incident response operations 10 
b. Routine/Periodic Maintenance Maintenance Operations 25 
c. Bridge Maintenance Operations NA 
d. Rest area maintenance operations NA 
5. Plan for compliance with standards 10 
a. Comliance with current department procedures, FL Statutes and FL 
Admistrative Code 
5 
b. Compliance with current department Manuals, Guides and Handbook 5 
                                                                              Max Technical Raw Score =  100 
 
 
 
To be able to express the total proposal score as a function of technical marks 
and bid price, the concept of price ratio, R, is introduced, as follows:  
                                     𝑅 =   𝑃
𝑃𝐿
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A 3-D graph that represents the relationship between TPS, TTM, and R for 
FDOT’s method is shown in Figure 2.  
 
 
Fig. 2. 3-D Depiction of TPS as Function of Price Ratio and TTM for FDOT 
 
Virginia Department of Transportation Case Study 
           This case study consists of the Virginia Department of Transportation’s (VDOT) 
Turnkey Asset Maintenance Services (TAMS) contract on the Woodrow Wilson Bridge 
and associated highways. This project extends partly in the Commonwealth of Virginia 
and partly in the State of Maryland. The award is for five years (2010 to 2015), with a 
provision of two successive 2-year extension (a total of 4 years extension).  
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Figure 3 shows the flowchart for identifying the best-value bid for this 
maintenance contract.  
 
 
Fig. 3. Flowchart of VDOT’s Maintenance Contract Bid Evaluation Method 
 
The score evaluation criteria are shown in Table 4 where, out of a total of 100 
points, VDOT allocates 20 points for price criterion and the remaining 80 points for 
quality. The TS for the proposal is determined as the summation of technical points 
obtained from Table 4. The PS is computed relative to the lowest bid price according to 
Formula 3.4.   
 
                                           𝑃𝑆 =  𝑃𝐿
𝑃
× 20                                 (3.4) 
where PL is the lowest bid price and P1 is the Proposer’s bid price. 
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Table 4. Maximum Point Values for Evaluation Criteria Used by VDOT (VDOT 2009) 
Item Mark 
1.Experience and Qualifications 15  
           a. Reference   
           b. Experience  
a. Qualifications  
2.Quality of Ordinary Maintenance Plan 30  
           a. Quality of ordinary maintenance plan  
           b. Widrow Wilson Bridge inspection, maintenance and operations.   
           c. Quality Management Plan  
           d. Customer service, Timeliness Requirement and Tracking Plan  
           e. Third party damages accounting receivable claims process and 
 Reporting 
 
3.Quality of Emergency Response Plan 15  
           a. Quality of emergency response plan  
           b. Quality of severe weather plan  
4.Small Business Subcontracting plan 20  
5.Proposed Pricing Schedule 20  
 
The Total Proposal Score (TPS) is calculated using Formula 3.5.  
TPS = TS + PS                       (3.5)  
A 3-D graph that represents the relationship between TPS, TTM, and price ratio 
for VDOT is shown in Figure 4. 
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Fig. 4. 3-D Depiction of TPS as Function of Price Ratio and TTM for VDOT 
 
 
 
 
North Carolina Department of Transportation Case Study 
The North Carolina Department of Transportation (NCDOT 2007) case study 
consists of an interstate maintenance contract for 131 centerline miles on I-77, I-85, I-
485, and I-277 in Mecklenburg, Gaston, Cabarrus and Cleveland counties. The contract 
extends from May 2007 to April 2012. The actual bid tabulation for this case study has 
been attached to appendix C. The final Request for Proposal required that the contractor 
submits technical and financial offers separately and the best-value bid was identified 
based on both price and technical evaluation.  
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BIDs
Quality Credit %
Quality Value
Technical
Score 
Best Bid
Price
Yes
NoLowest 
Adjusted 
Price ?
Adjusted Price = 
Bid Price – Quality Value
Reject
            As shown in Figure 5, the bid evaluation criteria for this case study is based on 
the concept of quality credit.  A quality value is determined based on technical score (see 
Table 5) and quality credit percentage (see Table 6).  The quality value is computed as: 
Quality Value = Quality Credit % x Bid Price                 (3.6) 
Bid Prices are then adjusted based on the quality value, as follows: 
Adjusted Bid Price = Bid Price – Quality Value                 (3.7) 
The bid with the lowest adjusted bid price is identified as the best-value bid. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. Flowchart of NCDOT’s Maintenance Contract Bid Evaluation Method 
 
 
Table 5.  Technical Score Criteria for North Carolina DOT Case Study 
Technical Attribute Mark 
Management 20 
Responsiveness to Request for Proposal 40 
Maintenance of Traffic and Safety Plan 20 
Timeliness Requirements and Tracking 15 
Oral Interview 5 
Total Technical Mark = 100 
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 In Table 5, Responsiveness to RFP carried 40 points that included four 
subcategories: General 15 points; Quality Management 15 points; Minority and 
Women’s Business Enterprise and Small Business 5 points; and finally Natural 
Environmental Responsibility 5 points. After assigning the quality marks, NCDOT 
distributed the quality credit for each proposal. The maximum quality credit for this 
specific project was 20; meaning that the proposal with 100 technical marks (i.e., full 
marks) would receive a quality credit of 20%. The quality credit distribution for 
technical scores ranging between 100 and 80 is shown in Table 6.  A quality value is 
determined based on technical score (Table 5) and quality credit percentage (Table 6). 
The bid with the lowest adjusted bid price is identified as the best-value bid.  
 
Table 6. Quality Credit Distribution for Technical Proposal (NCDOT 2007) 
Technical  
Score 
Quality  
Credit (%) 
Technical  
Score 
Quality  
Credit (%) 
100 20 89 9 
99 19 88 8 
98 18 87 7 
97 17 86 6 
96 16 85 5 
95 15 84 4 
94 14 83 3 
93 13 82 2 
92 12 81 1 
91 11 80 0 
90 10   
 
 
 
Table 7 provides a hypothetical example to illustrate NCDOT’s method.  In this 
example, Contractor C has a technical score 90 and corresponding quality credit 
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percentage of 10. This leads to an adjusted bid price of $2,520,000 (using Eq. 3.6 and 
3.7). Since Contractor C has the lowest adjusted price, contractor C is selected as the 
best-value bid.  
      Table 7. Hypothetical Example for Calculating Adjusted Price (NCDOT 2007) 
Proposal TS Quality 
Credit (%) 
Price 
Proposal ($) 
Quality 
Value ($) 
Adjusted Price ($) 
A 95 15 3,000,000 450,000 2,550,000 
B 90 10 2,900,000 290,000 2,610,000 
C* 90 10 2,800,000 280,000 2,520,000 (Best-Value Bid) 
D 80 0 2,700,000 0 2,700,000 
E 70 0 2,600,000 0 2,600,000 
 
A 3-D graph that represents the relationship between Adjusted Price, TTM, and 
price ratio for NCDOT’s method is shown in Figure 6. 
 
  
Fig. 6. 3-D Depiction of Adjusted Price as Function of Price Ratio and TTM (NCDOT) 
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New Zealand Transport Agency Case Study 
The New Zealand Transport Agency (NZTA 2009) awarded its Westcoast and 
Canterbury region highway maintenance contract for a 5-year period (2009 to 2014). 
The bid evaluation procuedure followed the Price Quality Method (PQM) which is 
described in Figure 7. Bid prices are adjusted by subtracting the supplier quality 
premium (SQP) from the submitted bid price.  
 
 
Fig. 7. Flowchart of NZTA’s Maintenance Contract Bid Evaluation Method 
 
This bid evaluation method is described through an example. This hypothetical 
example consists of four bidders with different quality attributes and prices.  
  
25 
As shown in Table 8,  a weighted sum index is computed for each bidder based 
on several technical attributes (relevant experience, track recor, technical skills, 
resources, management skills, and methodology). Each individual index is computed as 
the the product of an assessed grade and an attribute weight. The weights are determined 
by NZTA and the grade is determined by agency’s evaluators.   
 
  Table 8. Weighted Sum Calculation for NZTA (NZTA 2009) 
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1 69 2.07 83 2.49 83 3.32 78 5.46 82 3.28 55 4.95 21.57 
2 75 2.25 87 2.61 87 3.48 87 6.09 84 3.36 80 7.20 24.99 
3 68 2.04 84 2.52 80 3.20 76 5.32 79 3.16 57 5.13 21.37 
4 75 2.25 85 2.55 87 3.48 85 5.95 82 3.28 60 5.40 22.91 
Lowest Weighted Sum     21.37 
*Index = %Weight x Grade. (see Table 10 for weights)  
 
Table 9 shows the attributes and their weights. Once the weighted sum (WS) is 
computed, then the weighted sum margin is calculated for each bidder by subtracting the 
weighted sum of the contractor from the lowest weighted sum of all bidders. A supplier 
quality premium (SQP) (Table 10) is computed as follows: 
SQP = Agency’s Estimate x (WS Margin / Price Weight)                 (3.8) 
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Table 9. Technical Score Criteria (New Zealand Transportation Agency Case Study) 
Bid Attributes  Weight 
Relevant Experience 3%  
Track Record 3%  
Technical Skills 4%  
Resources 7%  
Management Skills 4%  
Methodology  9%  
Price 70%  
TOTAL 100% 
 
In this hypothetical example, the agency’s estimate for this project is $1,000,000 
and the price weight is 70, as decided by the agency.  
 
Table 10. Calculation of Supplier Quality Premium for NZTA 
Bidder WS Margin  
(WS – Lowest WS) 
Supplier Quality Premuim 
(SQP) (dollars) 
1 0.2 2,857.14 
2 3.62 51,714.29 
3 0 0 
4 1.54 22,000.00 
 
An adjusted price is then computed as follows: 
          Adjusted Price = Bid Price - SQP                                                 (3.9) 
As shown in table 11, Bidder 2 received a quality premium of $51,714 and the 
bid price was $1,117,030, thus the adjusted price for this bidder is $1,065,315 (which is 
the best-value bid).  
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Table 11. Identification of Best-Value Bid for NZTA 
  
Bidder 
SQP  (dollars) Original Bid Price 
(dollars) 
 
Adjusted Bid Price (dollars) 
1 2,857.14 1,250,240 1,247,382 
2* 51,714.29 1,117,030 1,065,315 (Best Value Bid) 
3 0 1,109,470 1,109,470 
4 22,000 1,182,970 1,160,970 
 
 
A 3-D graph that represents the relationship between Adjusted Price, TTM, and 
price ratio for NZTA’s method is shown in Figure 8. 
 
 
Fig. 8. 3-D Depiction of Adjusted Price as Function of Price Ratio and TTM for NZTA 
 
United Kingdom Highway Agency Case Study 
The United Kingdom Highway Agency (UKHA) outsources the maintenance 
contract through a Managing Agent Contract (MAC). The bid evaluation process is 
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illustrated in Figure 9.  Quality marks are assigned for project specific criteria (pre-
defined by the agency) based on the contractor’s approach to meet these criteria. The 
bidder’s proposed approach is verified through supporting evidence from its past 
performance records.  
 
 
       Fig. 9. Flowchart for UKHA Bid Evaluation Method 
 
Table 12 shows the the assessment criteria along with example marks (for a 
hypothetical bidder).  It can be seen that quality mark is assigned as the minimum of two 
marks: Part A mark on proposed approach and Part B mark on evidence provided by the 
bidder. For example, in the “Reducing Congestion” category, Part A mark is 9 and Part 
B mark is 8. Since Part B mark is the minimum of A and B, the quality mark assigned 
for this example bidder in this category is 8.  
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Table 12. Quality Marks for UKHA Bid Evaluation (UKHA 2009) 
  
 
 
Assessment Criteria 
Part A Marks 
(0-10) 
Part B 
Marks (0-10) 
 
Lower of 
Mark A 
and B 
Approach on 
this Contract 
Evidence 
from past 
projects 
Maintaining Network Value 8 7 7 
Enabling Network Use 8 8 8 
Reducing Congestion 9 8 8 
High Quality Customer Service 8 7 7 
Improving Efficiency 9 8 8 
Effective Management 9 7 7 
Control of Quality 9 9 9 
Reliability of Cost Estimates 9 8 8 
Reliability of Time Estimates 9 8 8 
Improvement of Safety 9 9 9 
              Total  79 
 
 
Part A marks and Part B marks are obtained from Tables 13 and 14, respectively.  
 
Table 13. Categories for Part A Marks (UKHA 2009)  
 
Proposed 
Approach 
How well does the proposed approach demonstrate an 
understanding of the project objectives and address the main 
management and technical risks relating to the project?   
Marks 
Week The approach fails to demonstrate an adequate understanding of 
the project objectives and fails to address adequately the main 
management and technical risks 
1-4 
Acceptable The approach demonstrates an adequate understanding of the 
project objectives and covers the main management and 
technical risks to an acceptable standard 
5-7 
Good The approach demonstrates a good understanding of the project 
objectives. It deals fully with the main management and 
technical risks and provides for delivering continual 
improvement over the life of the project 
8-9 
Excellent The approach has been tailored specifically to suit the project 
objectives, uses innovative approaches to deal comprehensively 
with the main management and technical risks, and is likely to 
maximize performance against Key Performance Indicators and 
deliver continual improvement.  
10 
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Table 14. Categories for Part B Marks (UKHA 2009) 
Supporting 
Evidence 
How well does the evidence from previous projects provide 
confidence that the proposed approach is likely to be successfully 
delivered.  
 Mark 
Week There is little evidence that the proposed approach has been 
influenced by experience on other projects 
1-4 
Acceptable There is an adequate level of evidence that the proposed approach has 
been developed as a result of successful experience on other projects 
5-7 
Good There is substantial evidence that the proposed approach has been 
developed from other projects using formal continual improvement 
processes 
8-9 
Excellent There is substantial evidence that the approach has been developed 
using continual improvement processes, which are routinely used to 
develop approaches and deliver the objectives successfully on all 
projects. 
10 
 
After assigning the quality marks, the bidder with the highest quality mark is 
given a technical score of 100. The remaining bidders receive a deduction of one quality 
mark for each full percentage point below the highest quality mark.  A price score is 
determined in a similar manner. The lowest bidder receives a price score of 100 and the 
remaining bidders receive a deduction of one price mark for each full percentage point 
above the lowest bid.  The total proposal score is computed as follows: 
TPS = 0.7 x TS + 0.3 x PS         (3.10)  
where TPS is total proposal score; TS is technical score; and PS is price score. The 
bidder with highest TPS is determined as the Leading Bidder (or best-value bid). This 
process is described through the hypothetical example shown in Tables 15, 16, and 17.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
31 
Table 15. Quality Score Distribution (UK-HA 2009) 
 
Bidder 
 
Quality 
Mark 
% below 
Highest Quality 
Mark 
 
Reduction 
 
TS 
A 68 13.9% 13 87 
B 61 22.8% 22 78 
C* 79 0.0% 0 100 (Highest Quality) 
D 75 5.1% 5 95 
E 65 17.7% 17 83 
             
 
                Table 16. Financial Score Distribution (UK-HA 2009) 
Bidder Bid Price % above 
lowest Price 
Deduction PS 
A 52,000,000 23.8% 23 77 
  B* 42,000,000 0% 0 100 (Lowest Bid) 
C 55,000,000 30.9% 30 70 
D 47,000,000 11.9% 11 89 
E 44,000,000 4.8% 4 96 
 
 
As shown in Table17, contractor D is the highest combined scorer and thus 
determined as the best-value bidder.  
 
Table 17. Combined Score Calculation (UKHA 2009) 
Bidder 70% of TS 30% of PS TPS 
A 60.9 23.1 84.0 
B 54.6 30.0 84.6 
C 70.0 21.0 91.0 
D* 66.5 26.7 93.2 (Best-Value Bid) 
E 58.1 28.8 86.9 
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A 3-D graph that represents the relationship between TPS, TTM, and price ratio 
for UKHA’s method is shown in Figure 10. 
 
Fig. 10. 3-D Depiction of TPS as Function of Price Ratio and TTM for HAUK 
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CHAPTER IV 
ANALYSIS OF CASE STUDIES 
In this chapter, the best-value bid identification methods discussed earlier are 
evaluated in terms the agency’s willingness to pay for quality and the neutrality of these 
methods with respect to lowest bid and highest quality.  
 
Evaluation of Willingness to Pay for Quality 
A best-value bidding system represents the agency’s willingness to pay for bid 
quality (i.e. contractor performance track record).  The agency’s willingness to pay for 
any given increment in quality score over the quality score of the lowest bidder is 
evaluated using the the concept of equivalent bid. Suppose that the lowest bidder has a 
bid price PL, total technical marks of TTML, and a technical score of TSL. For any other 
bidder (with a bid price of P and total technical marks of TTM) to be equivalent to the 
lowest bidder, their technical score (TS) must be greater than TSL, so that their total 
proposal score (TPS) becomes equal to the total proposal score of the lowest bidder 
(TPSL).  The agency’s willngness to pay for quality can then be measured using a curve 
that represents the relationship between technical score and bid price ratio p. This 
analysis was carried out on each of the case studies using a TTML of 80, as discussed in 
the following sections of this thesis report.  
 
FDOT Bid Evaluation Method 
Using Formulas 3.1 through 3.3, TPSL and TPS can be expressed as follows: 
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𝑇𝑃𝑆𝐿 =  
𝑃𝐿
𝑃𝐿  
∗ 30 +  𝑇𝑇𝑀𝐿 ∗ 0.7 
𝑇𝑃𝑆 =  
𝑃𝐿
𝑃 
∗ 30 +  𝑇𝑇𝑀 ∗ 0.7 
where TPSL is the total proposal score for the lowest bidder; TPS is the total proposal 
score for the equivalent proposer; TTML is the total technical marks for the lowest 
bidder; TTM is the total technical marks for the equivalent proposer; PL is the lowest bid 
price; and P is the bid price for the equivalent proposer. 
If the two proposals are equivalent then, TPS = TPSL. Thus, the price ratio R is 
computed as follows:  
                                 𝑅 =  30
0.7∗ 𝑇𝑇𝑀𝐿− 𝑇𝑇𝑀 +30
                                                                (4.1) 
The R vs. TTM  curve represents FDOT’s willingness to pay for quality (see 
Figure 11).  For example, the agency in this case is willing to pay for the highest quality 
bidder (100 score) 1.9 times (90% more) of the price of the lowest bidder (who is 
assumed to have a TTM of 80).  
 
VDOT Bid Evaluation Method 
Since VDOT’s technical marks range between zero and 80, it was necessary to 
convert this range to 0-100 to be consistent with the bid evaluation methods from the 
other case studies.  Thus, TPSL and TPS can be expressed as follows: 
𝑇𝑃𝑆𝐿 =  
𝑃𝐿
𝑃𝐿  
∗ 20 +  𝑇𝑇𝑀𝐿 ∗ 0.8 
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𝑇𝑃𝑆 =  
𝑃𝐿
𝑃 
∗ 20 +  𝑇𝑇𝑀 ∗ 0.8 
where TTM is on a 0-100 scale. 
If the two proposals are equivalent then, TPS1 = TPSL. Thus, the price ratio p is 
computed as follows:  
                                 𝑅 =  20
0.8∗ 𝑇𝑇𝑀𝐿− 𝑇𝑇𝑀 +20
                                                                (4.2) 
The R vs. TTM  curve represents VDOT’s willingness to pay for quality (see 
Figure 11).  For example, the agency in this case is willing to pay for the highest quality 
bidder (a TTM of 100) five times of the price of the lowest bidder (who is assumed to 
have a TTM of 80).  
 
NCDOT Bid Evaluation Method 
Using formula 3.6 and 3.7, the adjusted prices are expressed as follows:  
For 𝑇𝑇𝑀 ≥ 100 −  𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑥  
𝐴𝑃𝐿 =  𝑃𝐿 − 𝑃𝐿 ×  𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑥 −  100 − 𝑇𝑇𝑀𝐿  × 0.01  
                  𝐴𝑃 =  𝑃 − 𝑃 ×  𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑥 −  100 − 𝑇𝑇𝑀  × 0.01  
where APL is the adjusted price for the lowest bidder; AP is the adjusted price for the 
equivalent proposer; and Qmax is the maximum quality credit. 
If the two proposals are equivalent then, AP = APL. Thus, the price ratio R is 
computed as follows:  
                                         𝑅 =  200−𝑇𝑇𝑀𝐿− 𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑥
200− 𝑇𝑇𝑀− 𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑥
                                                            (4.3) 
For  𝑇𝑇𝑀 < 100 − 𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑥  the bidder does not receive any quality credit and thus R = 1.0 
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In this case study, the maximum quality credit was 20.  The R vs. TTM curve 
represents NCDOT’s willingness to pay for quality (see Figure 11).  For example, 
NCDOT in this case is willing to pay for the highest quality bidder (a TTM of 100) 1.25 
times (25% more) the price of the lowest bidder (who is assumed to have a TTM of 80).  
 
NZTA Bid Evaluation Method 
Using formula 3.8 and 3.9, the adjusted prices are expressed as follows: 
𝐴𝑃𝐿 =  𝑃𝐿  
𝐴𝑃 =  𝑃 −  
𝑊𝑆 − 𝑊𝑆𝐿
70
∗ 𝑁𝐸 
where APL is the adjusted price for the lowest quality bid; AP is the adjusted price for 
the equivalent proposer; WSL is the weighted sum for the lowest quality bid; WS is the 
weighted sum for the equivalent proposer; and NE is the net estimate of the bid price by 
the agency.  
If the two bids are equivalent, then AP = APL and the price ratio with respect to 
the lowest bid price is given by,  
                                    𝑅 =  1 +  𝑁𝐸
70∗ 𝑃𝐿
∗ (𝑊𝑆 −  𝑊𝑆𝐿)                                               (4.4) 
Since NZTA’s WS (which represents the total technical marks) ranges between 
zero and 30, it was necessary to convert this range to 0-100 to be consistent with the bid 
evaluation methods from the other case studies.  Thus, the price ratio equation becomes: 
                                    𝑅 =  1 +  0.3∗𝑁𝐸
70∗ 𝑃𝐿
∗ (𝑇𝑇𝑀 −  𝑇𝑇𝑀𝐿)                                          (4.5) 
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For this case study the price and TTM of the lowest bidder were $6,500,000 and 
80, and the agency’s net estimate was $9,850,000. Using these values, equation 4.5 can 
be plotted as shown in Figure 11 which represents the NZTA’s willingness to pay for 
quality. For example, the agency is willing to pay for the highest quality bidder (a TTM 
of 100) 1.12 times (12% more) of the price of the lowest bidder (who is assumed to have 
a TTM of 80).  
 
HAUK Bid Evaluation Method 
Using equation 3.10 and HAUK’s definition of price and technical scores, TPSL 
and TPS can be expressed as follows: 
𝑇𝑃𝑆𝐿 = 0.7 ∗  100 −
𝑇𝑇𝑀∗ − 𝑇𝑇𝑀𝐿
𝑇𝑇𝑀∗
 +  30 
𝑇𝑃𝑆 = 0.7 ∗  100 −
𝑇𝑇𝑀∗ − 𝑇
𝑇𝑇𝑀∗
 +  0.3  100 −  
𝑃 −  𝑃𝐿
𝑃𝐿
  
 
If the two proposals are equivalent then, TPS = TPSL. Thus, the price ratio R is 
computed as follows:  
                       𝑅 =  1 +  0.7
0.3
∗  
1
𝑇𝑇𝑀 ∗
∗ (𝑇𝑇𝑀 − 𝑇𝑇𝑀𝐿)                                      (4.6) 
Equation 4.6 is plotted in Figure 11 assuming a TTM* of 100. For example, the 
agency is willing to pay for the highest quality bidder (a TTM of 100)1.47 times (47% 
more) of the price of the lowest bidder (who is assumed to have a quality score of 80).  
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Discussion of Evaluation Results 
The purpose of this analysis is not to determine the optimal payment for quality, 
but rather to measure the agency’s willingness to pay for quality. Willingness-to-pay-
for-quality (WTP) curves are shown in Figures 11 and 12 for all case studies, assuming a 
TTML of 80 and TTML of 70. Since VDOT’s method uses a technical weight of 80%, if 
TTML is less than 70, a bidder with TTM=100 would be able to have a very high price 
and still be equivalent to the lowest bidder. Thus, VDOT’s method is not applicable 
when TTML=70. The optimum WTP curve is a matter of agency policy. Highway 
agencies can develop optimum WTP curves using direct survey, indirect survey 
(Discrete choice analysis), experiments or empirical methods (Breidert 2005). 
The VDOT method for best-bid evaluation provides the highest pay for quality, 
followed by the FDOT method, and then by the HAUK method. The NZTA and the 
NCDOT method provide the least pay for bid quality.  
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Fig. 11. Price Ratio Vs Technical Marks (TTML=80) 
 
                               Fig. 12. Price Ratio Vs Technical Marks (TTML=70) 
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The FDOT and VDOT methods use the concept of technical and price weights 
that add to 100%. FDOT uses technical and price weights of 70% and 30%, respectively; 
whereas VDOT uses technical and price weights of 80% and 20%, respectively. As 
shown in Figure 11, these weights have a dramatic impact on the WTP curves. Highway 
agencies can set these weights to achieve a desired WTP curve (set by the agency’s 
policy).  
               The NCDOT and NZTA methods both use the adjusted price concept to 
identify the best-value bid. The WTP curves depend on the quality credit used by these 
methods.  However, for the specific parameters used in these case studies, agencies that 
use the price and technical weights concept appear to be more willing to pay for quality 
than those that use the adjusted price concept. 
 The UKHA method is the only method that considers the maximum quality 
offered by the bidders. Thus the bid mechanism is influenced by the quality of the 
highest bidder, instead of the price of the lowest bidder as in the case of the FDOT and 
VDOT method.  
 
Neutrality in Best-Value Bid Evaluation Methods 
To assess neutrality in the studied bid-evaluation methods with respect to quality 
and price, a Monte Carlo simulation of four hypothetical bids (A through D) with 
different bid prices and technical marks was carried. It should be noted that VDOT’s and 
FDOT’s methods use the same concept (i.e., technical and price weights).  Only FDOT’s 
method is simulated; however, FDOT’s results can be extended to VDOT’s method. In 
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this analysis, it is assumed that the bidders will choose their prices based on the WTP 
curves (discussed earlier in this Chapter).  Assuming that the lowest bidder has a total 
technical mark of 70 and a bid price of =$6.0 million (i.e., TTML=70 and PL=$6.0 
million), the ranges for the total technical mark and bid price of these hypothetical bids 
would be as illustrated in Table 18.  
 
Table 18. Hypothetical Bid Price Range and Technical Marks 
 
Bidder 
TTM  
Range 
Bid Price Range 
 $ million 
  FDOT NCDOT UKHA NZTA 
A 86-90 9.2-10.8 7.1-7.4 8.1-8.7 6.6-6.8 
B 81-85 7.8-8.9 6.7-7.0 7.4-8.0 6.4-6.6 
C 76-80 6.8-7.6 6.3-6.6 6.7-7.26 6.2-6.4 
D 70-75 6.0-6.6 6.0-6.3 6.0-6.56 6.0-6.2 
 
 
For each best-value bid evaluation method, Monte Carlo simulation was used to 
generate 3000 bidding cases from the TTM and corresponding bid price ranges shown in 
Table 18. A best-value bid was then identified for each simulated bidding case. The 
probability of being identified as the best-value bid was then computed as follows: 
 𝑃𝑟 =  
𝑁𝐷
𝑁𝑇
∗ 10                                                                       (4.7) 
 
where Pr is the probability of being selected as best-value bid; ND is the number of times 
(i.e., number of simulation iterations) for which the bid is selected as best-value bid; NT 
is the total number of simulation iterations. 
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Since the bid prices were determined according the WTP curves, the behaviour 
of the analyzed methods can be classified as follows: 
 Balanced: all bids have approximatly equal probability of being identified as 
best-value bid 
 Favors Quality: bids with higher total technical mark have higher probability of 
being identified as best-value bid  
 Favors Low Bid Price:  bids with low bid price have higher probability of being 
identified as best-value bid 
The results of the simulation are illustrated in Figure 13-16 and the detailed 
inputs and results are shown in Appendix A. Figure 13 shows that Bid D (lowest bidder 
and least TTM) has the highest probability of being identified as the best-value bid, 
whereas Bid A (highest bidder and highest TTM) has the lowest probability of being 
selected.  Thus, FDOT’s method appears to favor low bid prices. Since bidders cannot 
predict the low bid with certainty, an underestimation of the low bid can mislead other 
bidders to raise their price and consequently lose the bid, as described in Figure 14.  
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Fig. 13. FDOT’s Best Bid Simulation Results 
 
 
 
Fig. 14. Change in Price Ratio Vs change in TTM 
 
 
Figure 15 shows that Bid A (highest bidder and highest TTM) has the highest 
probability of being identified as the best-value bid, whereas Bid D (lowest bidder and 
least TTM) has the lowest probability of being selected.  Thus, UKHA’s method appears 
to favor high-quality bids.  
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Fig. 15. UKHA’s Best Bid Simulation Results  
 
Figures 16 and 17 show that approximately all bids have equal chances of being 
identified as the best-value bid.  Thus, NCDOT’s and NZTA’s methods appear to be 
balanced. 
 
 
Fig. 16. NCDOT’s Best Bid Simulation Results 
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Fig. 17. NZTA’s Best Bid Simulation Results 
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CHAPTER V 
CUSTOMIZATION OF BEST-VALUE BID SELECTION METHODS  
To help highway agencies customize the bid evaluation methods discussed earlier to 
specific projects, a software tool was developed and is discussed in this chapter. 
 
Customization Process 
This process involves determining the relative importance of bid price and bid 
quality to the agency based on project-specific parameters. The inputs, mathematical 
models, and outputs of this process are illustrated in Figure 18 for each category of the 
studied best-value bid selection methods (balanced, favors low bid, and favors high 
quality). Since NZTA’s and NCDOT’s methods are both “balanced”, only NCDOT’s 
method is considered in this analysis. As discussed earlier, NCDOT’s method has an 
additional advantage of not requiring the agency to make and publish a bid net estimate.  
 
 
Fig. 18. Summary for Determining Technical and Financial Weights 
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Highway agencies can determine the willingness to pay for maximum quality 
(WTPmax) (in dollars) based on agency’s budget limit, policy guideline, public 
willingness to pay for high quality maintenance, performance risks by the contractor and 
associated negative impacts on the agency and the public. However, there is a minimum 
acceptable quality limit (expressed in terms of minimum acceptable total technical mark, 
or TTML) below which the quality cannot be accepted by the public and thereby by the 
agency.  Finally, this process assumes that the agency can anticipate the lowest bid price 
(based on past experience and historical data). 
This process is discussed for each method as follows: 
 
FDOT Bid Evaluation Method 
Using Equation 4.1 (derived in Chapter Four), the price ratio for maximum 
quality bid (with TTM = 100), R*, can be computed as follows: 
𝑅∗ =   
𝑊𝑓
𝑊𝑓−0.01 ∗𝑊𝑡∗(100−𝑇𝑇𝑀𝐿)
      
where TTML is the technical marks for the lowest quality bid; Wt is a 0-100 technical 
weight, and Wf is a 0-100 financial weight.  
By replacing Wt with 100 – Wf  and simplifying the above equation, the financial and 
technical weights can be calculated as  
                                              𝑊𝑓 =   
(100−𝑇𝑇𝑀𝐿)
1− 1
𝑅∗ 
+ 
(100−𝑇𝑇𝑀𝐿)
100
                                                                 (5.1)   
where by definition, 𝑅∗ = (𝑃𝐿 + 𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑚𝑎𝑥 )/𝑃𝐿 
                                          𝑊𝑡 =  100 − 𝑊𝑓                                                               (5.2) 
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HAUK Bid Evaluation Method 
Using Equation 4.6 (derived in Chapter Four), the price ratio for maximum 
quality bid (with TTM = 100), R*, can be computed as follows: 
                   𝑅∗ =  1 +  
𝑊𝑓
𝑊𝑡
∗  
1
100
∗ (100 − 𝑇𝑇𝑀𝐿)  
where TTML is the technical marks for the lowest quality bid; Wt is a 0-100 technical 
weight; and Wf is a 0-100 financial weight.  
By replacing Wt with 100 – Wf  and simplifying the above equation, the financial 
and technical weights can be calculated as 
                             𝑊𝑓 =   
100
1+ 100(𝑅
∗−1)
(100−𝑇𝑇𝑀𝐿) 
                                                                        (5.3) 
where by definition, 𝑅∗ = (𝑃𝐿 + 𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑚𝑎𝑥 )/𝑃𝐿 
  𝑊𝑡 =  100 − 𝑊𝑓 
 
NCDOT Bid Evaluation Method 
In this method, a maximum quality credit is determined in lieu of technical and 
financial weights.  Using Equation 4.3 (derived in Chapter Four), the price ratio for 
maximum quality bid (with TTM = 100), R*, can be computed as follows: 
             𝑅∗  =  
200−𝑇𝑇𝑀𝐿− 𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑥
100− 𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑥
 
where TTML is the technical marks for the lowest quality bid and Qmax is the maximum 
quality credit. Thus, 
Using the above formula, Qmax can be computed as follows: 
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                                          𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑥 =  
200−100∗𝑅∗−𝑇𝑇𝑀𝐿
1−𝑅∗                                                          
(5.4) 
However, to ensure that the adjusted price is not less than the lowest bid, Qmax ≥ 
100-TTML.  If Equation 5.4 results in 𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑥  < 100 − 𝑇𝑇𝑀𝐿 , Qmax can be computed as 
follows: 
                                        𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑥 =  
100∗(𝑅∗−1)
𝑅∗                                                                          
(5.5) 
 
Application of the Customization Process 
A software tool was developed to facilitate the application of the above 
customization process (see Figure 18).  The application of this process is further 
explained through the example shown in Table 19. 
 
    Table 19. Sample Input and Corresponding Output for Customization Process 
 
Method 
 
Lowest 
Bid  
PL  ($ mil) 
 
WTP 
($ mil) 
 
TTML 
 
R* 
 
Wf, % 
 
Wt 
% 
 
Qmax 
Favors Low Bid 6,500,000 1,000,000 70 1.154 69 31 NA 
 
Favors High Quality 
 
6,500,000 1,000,000 70 1.154 66 34 NA 
Neutral 6,500,000 1,000,000 70 1.154 NA NA 13 
 
 
For the same project-specific parameters (inputs), the customization process has 
resulted in a higher financial weight for the bid evaluation method that favors low bid 
(compared to that of the bid evaluation method that favors high quality).  Again, for the 
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same inputs, the customization process has resulted in a maximum quality credit value of 
13. 
 
 
Fig. 19.TxBID Tool for TxDOT Bid Design.  
 
Finally, it should be noted that the quality attributes or criteria must also be 
carefully chosen to align the contractor quality with the agency needs and project focus. 
Table 20 shows a comparison of the quality attributes used by the agencies in the case 
studies. These default technical marks are associated with the technical and financial 
weights and quality credit as shown in Table 21. 
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Table 20. Comparison of Quality Attributes Used by Different Agencies  
Quality Attributes  Vs TTM NZTA FDOT VDOT NCDOT HAUK 
Relevant Experience 7% 10% 18.75%   
Track Record 13%     
Technical Skills 13%     
Resources 17%     
Management Skill (Personnel) 17% 10%  15%  
Management Skill (Company Systems) / 
Quality Control / Health & Safety 
  10% 
Methodology / Operation Plan / Routine / 
Periodic Maintenance Operations 
33% 25% 37.5% 20% 10% 
Executive Summary  5%    
DBE/Respect/Agency 
Participation/Minority/Women Business 
 2% 25% 5%  
Proposed Facilities Capabilities  3%    
Customer Service Resolution Plan / High 
Quality Customer Service 
 10%   10% 
Incident Response Operations  10%    
Plan to Achieve and Maintain MRP  15%    
Plan for Compliance With standards  10%    
Emergency Response Plan   18.75%   
Oral Interview    5%  
Timeliness Requirements and Tracking    15%  
Maintenance of Traffic and Safety Plan    20% 10% 
Natural Environment Responsibility    5%  
Understanding of Major components and 
Issues, Innovation, Initial Condition 
Assessment, Assessing and Collecting 
Funds as Third Party Claims etc. 
   15%  
Predictability of Cost     10% 
Predictability of Time     10% 
Improving efficiency and achieving 
continual improvement 
    10% 
Reducing Congestion     10% 
Maintaining Network Value     10% 
Enabling Network Use     10% 
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Table 21. Default Weights and Quality Credit 
 
Method Wf, % Wt % Quality Credit % 
FDOT 30 70 NA 
VDOT 20 80 NA 
NCDOT NA NA Qmax=20 
UK 30 70 NA 
NZTA NA NA WS = 30 
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CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
This chapter is comprised of the summary of the research, conclusions that can 
be drawn based on the findings, and recommendations for future research in this context.  
 
Summary 
Based on a review of the literature of performance-based contracting and 
interviews of maintenance engineers at TxDOT, it was clear that lowest bid with   
minimum acceptable total technical marks is not suitable for the procurement of 
performance- based maintenance contracts. Rather, a contractor should be selected based 
on both quality and price. Five best-value bid identification methods that are already in 
practice by the state transportation agencies in Florida, Virginia, North Carolina, United 
Kingdom, and New Zealand were used as case studies for this research. These five 
methods were evaluated in terms of the agency’s willingness to pay for quality and the 
neutrality of these methods with respect to lowest bid and highest quality. This analysis 
was conducted to investigate the inclination of these methods towards selecting lowest 
bid, higher quality bid or any bid with equal probability. To understand and describe the 
bid evaluation method, the agency can develop a willingness to pay (WTP) curve. This 
curve should represent the agency’s needs and budget, reflect their project 
characteristics, and accommodate associated performance risks. 
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An Excel macro based software tool has been developed that automates these 
five best-value bid identification methods and also helps customize anyone of these 
options for any agency. Inputs to the customization algorithm include the maximum 
WTP amount, the minimum acceptable quality level, and an estimation of the lowest bid 
price. The outputs are appropriate price and quality weights, or a quality credit. 
Additionally, the transportation agency should determine appropriate attributes and 
marks for quality evaluation. The agency should carefully pick the quality evaluation 
criteria that will relate to the contractor’s expected performance on site. The quality 
evaluation criteria used in the case studies are presented and compared. These criteria 
can be customized for any other agency and project.  
 
Conclusion 
Based on the analysis of the five case studies, the following conclusions can be 
made: 
 Procedures that require minimum quality level and compare bidders against the 
lowest bid (i.e., FDOT’s and VDOT’s methods) tend to favor lowest bidder 
eventhough other bids follow the agency’s willingness to pay curve. 
 Procedures that require minimum quality level and compare bidders against both 
the lowest bid and highest quality (i.e., UKHA’s method) tend to favor the 
highest quality bidder eventhough other bids follow the gancy’s willingness to 
pay curve. 
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 Procedures that assign quality credit for each bidder in proportion to their quality 
level (i.e., NCDOT’s and NZTA’s methods) tend to be neutral (i.e., do not favor 
lowest bidder or highest quality) to bids that follow the agency’s willingness to 
pay curve. 
 Agency- and project-specific inputs (maximum WTP, minimum acceptable 
quality level, and estimated lowest bid price, and a shape for the WTP curve) can 
be used to customize any of the five-studied methods for best-value bid 
evaluation. 
 
Future Research 
Based on the results of this research and the literature review, future research 
areas have been identified as follows: 
 Determine quality evaluation criteria (both attributes and marks) based on 
analysis of historical performance data and corresponding evaluation criteria that 
were used to select the best-value bidder. 
 Determine the shape of the willingness to pay (WTP) curves based on an analysis 
of the risk of failing to meet the agency-specified performance targets. 
 Although the five case studies are fairly representative of the existing state-of-
the-practice in best-value bid evaluation methods, the customization process 
developed in this research needs to be extended beyond these five case studies. 
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Technical 
Marks
UK Equivalent 
Bid Price @ 70% 
Technical Weight 
Ratio
71 6000000
72 6140000
73 6280000
74 6420000
75 6560000
76 6700000
77 6840000
78 6980000
79 7120000
80 7260000
81 7400000
82 7540000
83 7680000
84 7820000
85 7960000
86 8100000
87 8240000
88 8380000
89 8520000
90 8660000
91 8800000
92 8940000
93 9080000
94 9220000
95 9360000
96 9500000
97 9640000
98 9780000
99 9920000
100 10060000
D C B A
Low 71 76 81 86
High 75 80 85 90
Low 6000000 6700000 7400000 8100000
High 6560000 7260000 7960000 8660000
Cycle 1 1000 93 140 278 481
Cycle 2 1000 88 132 311 488
Cycle 3 1000 76 159 309 472
Average 1000 86 144 299 480
Price Range
Bidders
Technical 
Range
APPENDIX A 
BEST-VALUE BID SIMULATION 
 
 
Simulation – 1 
UK   
Sample Quality Range 71-75, Price Range 6.0 – 6.56 mil. 
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D C B A
Low 71 76 81 86
High 75 80 85 90
Low 6000000 6000000 6000000 6000000
High 8660000 8660000 8660000 8660000
Cycle 1 1000 4 24 216 728
Cycle 2 1000 1 40 216 709
Cycle 3 1000 1 43 236 709
Average 1000 2 36 223 715
Price Range
Bidders
Technical 
Range
Technical 
Marks
UK Equivalent 
Bid Price @ 
70% Technical 
Weight Ratio
71 6000000
72 6140000
73 6280000
74 6420000
75 6560000
76 6700000
77 6840000
78 6980000
79 7120000
80 7260000
81 7400000
82 7540000
83 7680000
84 7820000
85 7960000
86 8100000
87 8240000
88 8380000
89 8520000
90 8660000
91 8800000
92 8940000
93 9080000
94 9220000
95 9360000
96 9500000
97 9640000
98 9780000
99 9920000
100 10060000
 
 
Simulation – 2 
UK 
Sample Quality Range 71-75, Price Range 6.0 – 8.66 mil. 
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Technical 
Marks
UK Equivalent 
Bid Price @ 
70% Technical 
Weight Ratio
71 6000000
72 6140000
73 6280000
74 6420000
75 6560000
76 6700000
77 6840000
78 6980000
79 7120000
80 7260000
81 7400000
82 7540000
83 7680000
84 7820000
85 7960000
86 8100000
87 8240000
88 8380000
89 8520000
90 8660000
91 8800000
92 8940000
93 9080000
94 9220000
95 9360000
96 9500000
97 9640000
98 9780000
99 9920000
100 10060000
D C B A
Low 71 78 86 93
High 77 85 92 100
Low 6000000 6980000 8100000 9080000
High 6840000 7960000 8940000 10060000
Cycle 1 1000 137 200 294 377
Cycle 2 1000 142 180 278 389
Cycle 3 1000 129 175 259 391
Average 1000 136 185 277 386
Price    
Range
Bidders
Technical 
Range
 
Simulation - 3 
UK 
Sample Quality Range 71-77, Price Range 6.0 – 6.84 mil. 
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Technical 
Marks
UK Equivalent 
Bid Price @ 
70% Technical 
Weight Ratio
61 6000000
62 6155556
63 6311111
64 6466667
65 6622222
66 6777778
67 6933333
68 7088889
69 7244444
70 7400000
71 7555556
72 7711111
73 7866667
74 8022222
75 8177778
76 8333333
77 8488889
78 8644444
79 8800000
80 8955556
81 9111111
82 9266667
83 9422222
84 9577778
85 9733333
86 9888889
87 10044444
88 10200000
89 10355556
90 10511111
D C B A
Low 61 68 76 83
High 67 75 82 90
Low 6000000 7088889 8333333 9422222
High 6933333 8177778 9266667 10511111
Cycle 1 1000 137 189 265 391
Cycle 2 1000 137 194 272 394
Cycle 3 1000 144 212 305 397
Average 1000 139 198 281 394
Price    
Range
Bidders
Technical 
Range
 
Simulation - 4 
UK 
Sample Quality Range 61-67, Price Range 6.0 – 6.93 mil. 
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Technical 
Marks
UK Equivalent 
Bid Price @ 
50% Technical 
Weight Ratio
61 6000000
62 6066667
63 6133333
64 6200000
65 6266667
66 6333333
67 6400000
68 6466667
69 6533333
70 6600000
71 6666667
72 6733333
73 6800000
74 6866667
75 6933333
76 7000000
77 7066667
78 7133333
79 7200000
80 7266667
81 7333333
82 7400000
83 7466667
84 7533333
85 7600000
86 7666667
87 7733333
88 7800000
89 7866667
90 7933333
D C B A
Low 61 68 76 83
High 67 75 82 90
Low 6000000 6466667 7000000 7466667
High 6400000 6933333 7400000 7933333
Cycle 1 1000 157 260 271 354
Cycle 2 1000 158 235 261 364
Cycle 3 1000 158 233 274 326
Average 1000 158 243 269 348
Price    
Range
Bidders
Technical 
Range
 
Simulation - 5 
UK 
Sample Quality Range 61-67, Price Range 6.0 – 6.40 mil. 
Technical : Financial Weight ratio = 50:50 
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D C B A
Low 71 76 81 86
High 75 80 85 90
Low 6000000 6792453 7826087 9230769
High 6617647 7594937 8910891 10778443
Cycle 1 1000 308 283 217 168
Cycle 2 1000 327 316 235 171
Cycle 3 1000 318 291 210 169
Average 1000 318 297 221 169
Technical 
Range
Price    
Range
Bidders
Technical 
Marks
FDOT  Equivalent 
Bid Price @ 70% 
Technical Weight 
Ratio
71 6000000
72 6143345
73 6293706
74 6451613
75 6617647
76 6792453
77 6976744
78 7171315
79 7377049
80 7594937
81 7826087
82 8071749
83 8333333
84 8612440
85 8910891
86 9230769
87 9574468
88 9944751
89 10344828
90 10778443
 
Simulation – 1 
FDOT 
Sample Quality Range 71-75, Price Range 6.0 – 6.61 mil. 
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D C B A
Low 71 76 81 86
High 75 80 85 90
Low 6000000 6532951 7169811 7944251
High 6418919 7032696 7776262 8695652
Cycle 1 1000 277 276 224 197
Cycle 2 1000 288 264 222 194
Cycle 3 1000 277 276 224 195
Average 1000 281 272 223 195
Technical 
Range
Price    
Range
Bidders
Technical 
Marks
FDOT Equivalent 
Bid Price @ 62% 
Technical Weight 
Ratio
71 6000000
72 6099518
73 6202394
74 6308799
75 6418919
76 6532951
77 6651109
78 6773619
79 6900726
80 7032696
81 7169811
82 7312380
83 7460733
84 7615230
85 7776262
86 7944251
87 8119658
88 8302986
89 8494784
90 8695652
 
Simulation – 2 
FDOT 
Sample Quality Range 71-75, Price Range 6.0 – 6.41 mil. 
Technical Weight 62% 
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Technical 
Marks
FDOT  Equivalent 
Bid Price @ 50% 
Technical Weight 
Ratio
61 6000000
62 6060606
63 6122449
64 6185567
65 6250000
66 6315789
67 6382979
68 6451613
69 6521739
70 6593407
71 6666667
72 6741573
73 6818182
74 6896552
75 6976744
76 7058824
77 7142857
78 7228916
79 7317073
80 7407407
81 7500000
82 7594937
83 7692308
84 7792208
85 7894737
86 8000000
87 8108108
88 8219178
89 8333333
90 8450704
D C B A
Low 61 68 76 83
High 67 75 82 90
Low 6000000 6451613 7058824 7692308
High 6382979 6976744 7594937 8450704
Cycle 1 1000 273 280 234 219
Cycle 2 1000 281 309 218 247
Cycle 3 1000 283 268 217 227
Average 1000 279 286 223 231
Technical 
Range
Price    
Range
Bidders
 
Simulation  - 3 
FDOT 
Sample Quality Range 61-67, Price Range 6.0 – 6.38 
mil. 
Technical Weight 50% 
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Technical 
Marks
NCDOT Equivalent 
Bid Price @ 67 Quality 
Credit
71 6000000
72 6098361
73 6200000
74 6305085
75 6413793
76 6526316
77 6642857
78 6763636
79 6888889
80 7018868
81 7153846
82 7294118
83 7440000
84 7591837
85 7750000
86 7914894
87 8086957
88 8266667
89 8454545
90 8651163
D C B A
Low 71 76 81 86
High 75 80 85 90
Low 6000000 6526316 7153846 7914894
High 6413793 7018868 7750000 8651163
Cycle 1 1000 201 252 253 266
Cycle 2 1000 237 232 266 263
Cycle 3 1000 236 242 258 276
Average 1000 225 242 259 268
Bidders
Technical 
Range
Price    
Range
 
 
Simulation – 1 
NCDOT 
Sample Quality Range 71-75, Price Range 6.0 – 6.41 mil. 
Quality Credit 67 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
\ 
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D C B A
Low 71 76 81 86
High 75 80 85 90
Low 6000000 6319149 6674157 7071429
High 6252632 6600000 6988235 7425000
Cycle 1 1000 215 241 233 276
Cycle 2 1000 233 264 256 290
Cycle 3 1000 224 246 268 249
Average 1000 224 250 252 272
Bidders
Technical 
Range
Price    
Range
Technical 
Marks
NCDOT Equivalent 
Bid Price @ 30 Quality 
Credit
71 6000000
72 6061224
73 6123711
74 6187500
75 6252632
76 6319149
77 6387097
78 6456522
79 6527473
80 6600000
81 6674157
82 6750000
83 6827586
84 6906977
85 6988235
86 7071429
87 7156627
88 7243902
89 7333333
90 7425000
 
 
Simulation - 2 
NCDOT 
Sample Quality Range 71-75, Price Range 6.0 – 6.25 
mil. 
Quality Credit 30 
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D C B A
Low 61 68 76 83
High 67 75 82 90
Low 6000000 6000000 6382979 6896552
High 6000000 6315789 6818182 7500000
Cycle 1 1000 155 175 304 335
Cycle 2 1000 171 187 305 359
Cycle 3 1000 164 173 308 356
Average 1000 163 178 306 350
Bidders
Technical 
Range
Price    
Range
Technical 
Marks
NCDOT Equivalent 
Bid Price @ 30 Quality 
Credit
61 6000000
62 6000000
63 6000000
64 6000000
65 6000000
66 6000000
67 6000000
68 6000000
69 6000000
70 6000000
71 6060606
72 6122449
73 6185567
74 6250000
75 6315789
76 6382979
77 6451613
78 6521739
79 6593407
80 6666667
81 6741573
82 6818182
83 6896552
84 6976744
85 7058824
86 7142857
87 7228916
88 7317073
89 7407407
90 7500000
 
 
Simulation - 3 
NCDOT 
Sample Quality Range 68-75, Price Range 6-6.32 mil 
Quality Credit 30 
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Technical 
Marks
NZTA Equivalent 
Bid Price @ 30% 
Weighted Sum
71 6000000
72 6042214
73 6084429
74 6126643
75 6168857
76 6211071
77 6253286
78 6295500
79 6337714
80 6379929
81 6422143
82 6464357
83 6506571
84 6548786
85 6591000
86 6633214
87 6675429
88 6717643
89 6759857
90 6802071
D C B A
Low 71 76 81 86
High 75 80 85 90
Low 6000000 6211071 6422143 6633214
High 6168857 6379929 6591000 6802071
Cycle 1 1000 237 254 246 234
Cycle 2 1000 258 254 221 240
Cycle 3 1000 241 239 258 229
Average 1000 245 249 242 234
Technical 
Range
Price    
Range
Bidders
Simulation -1  
NZTA 
Sample Quality Range 71-75, Price Range 6-6.17 mil 
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Technical 
Marks
NZTA Equivalent 
Bid Price @ 59% 
Weighted Sum
71 6000000
72 6141744
73 6283488
74 6425232
75 6566976
76 6708720
77 6850463
78 6992207
79 7133951
80 7275695
81 7417439
82 7559183
83 7700927
84 7842671
85 7984415
86 8126159
87 8267902
88 8409646
89 8551390
90 8693134
D C B A
Low 71 76 81 86
High 75 80 85 90
Low 6000000 6708720 7417439 8126159
High 6566976 7275695 7984415 8693134
Cycle 1 1000 245 238 260 248
Cycle 2 1000 249 251 233 240
Cycle 3 1000 274 233 253 256
Average 1000 256 241 249 248
Technical 
Range
Price    
Range
Bidders
 
Simulation  - 2 
NZTA 
Sample Quality Range 71-75, Price Range 6-6.57 
Technical Weight 59% 
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APPENDIX B 
FDOT BID TABULATION  
  
 
  
72 
 
 
 
  
73 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
74 
 
 
  
75 
APPENDIX C  
NCDOT BID TABULATION 
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